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I.

INTRODUCTION

The recent decisions concerning the University of Texas School of
Law's ("UT") 1992 affirmative action admission policy have created
concern among post-secondary admissions committees. Until Hopwood
v. Texas,1 schools were bound by the Supreme Court's 1978 decision
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke2 when creating
permissible affirmative action admission policies. However, the recent
Fifth Circuit Hopwoo<f decision and the Supreme Court's decision to
deny certiorari in that case4 leave unsettled the appropriate remedial
measures law schools may adopt in their efforts to balance the tension
between the goals of diversity and the legitimate interests of qualified
non-minority candidates.
This article will examine the Hopwood decisions. Part II will review
the factual and legal history behind the case. Part III will discuss the
District, Circuit, and Supreme Court decisions. Finally, Part N will
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· 1. 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 116 S.Ct. 2581 (1996).
2. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
3. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct 2581 (1996).
4. 116 S.Ct. 2581 (1996).
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critique these decisions and offer a view into the future for affirmative
action admissions policies. 5
II.

A.

HISTORY

The Facts of Hopwood v. Texas

In 1992, UT used a dual admission policy to ensure its entering class
was diverse in, among other things, race and ethnicity.6 All applicants
were reviewed in a similar manner. When rendering their decision,
committee members were asked to consider such factors as undergraduate GPA, LSAT score, undergraduate major, race, gender, past work
experience, and other relevant characteristics. The chairman of the
admissions committee assigned one subcommittee to consider
non-minority applicants and another subcommittee to consider minority
applicants.7 Consequently, when reviewing a particular file, a member
of the minority subcommittee could not consider a particular application

5. For a general discussion of the constitutionality of affirmative action
admissions policies, see Leslie Yalof Garfield, Squaring Affirmative Action Admissions
Policies with Federal Judicial Guidelines: A Model/or the Twenty-First Century, 22 J.C.
& U.L. 895 (1996).
6. The court noted that the diversity admission policy was not entirely voluntary
because UT adopted the policy in response to the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) Texas
plan. Nonetheless, the court concluded that under an equal protection analysis, the same
level of scrutiny applied to race conscious affirmative action plans adopted pursuant to
a consent agreement whether or not such plans were voluntarily adopted. Thus, the court
would uphold the policy if it met the Supreme Court's requirement that (1) there was
a compelling governmental interest, and (2) the policy was narrowly tailored to achieve
the goals of that interest. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 569 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986)). See also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299.
7. UT had two separate reviewing subcommittees. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 562.
The Chair of the Admissions Committee set a different presumptive admission or denial
Texas Index ("TI") number for minorities, who were reviewed by one subcommittee and
for non-minorities who were reviewed by a separate subcommittee. Id. at 561. The
Admissions Committee based acceptance to UT for all applicants on an index number
that is a function of each applicant's combined undergraduate grade point average
("UGPA") and LSAT score. Id. at 557 n.9. The Chair of the Admissions Committee
initially reviewed all applications regardless of the applicant's residency, race or ethnic
heritage and then set a number below which students were presumptively denied
admission and another number above which students were automatically admitted to the
school. Id. at 560-61. The subcommittees reviewed applicants with numbers between the
automatic admission and the automatic rejection numbers. Id. at 561. The admissions
office divided non-minority files into groups of thirty. Three members of the non-minority subcommittee reviewed each non-minority applicant on an individual basis. In
contrast, the entire minority sub-committee reviewed each minority applicant as a group.
In theory, each member of the minority subcommittee was to be part of the subcommittee to review non-minority files, however one member of the minority subcommittee did
not review non-minority applications. Id. at 562.
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with reference to a diverse group since he or she did not consider non-minority applications.
That same year, four individuals, all of them Caucasian,8 applied to
and were rejected from UT. 9 Each applicant had a marginal application
so that his or her LSAT and undergraduate grade scores were not
sufficient for acceptance under the school's general admissions policy. 10
However, each of these applicant's test scores and grades were superior
to many minority candidates accepted to the law school that year. 11

8. John C. Brittain, The Hopwood Decision; Obituary for Affirmative Action?,
TEXAS LAWYER, May 13, 1996 at 30.
9. The denied applicants were all white Texas residents. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp.
at 564. Cheryl J. Hopwood, had a TI of 199, and Kenneth Elliott, Douglas Carvell, and
David Rogers each had a TI of 197. Id. at 564-67.
UT contested the ripeness of the claims of Hopwood and Elliott because neither was
actually denied admission. Id. at 567. Moreover, UT maintained that all four applicants
lacked standing because they could not demonstrate that they would have been granted
admission absent the challenged admissions policy. Id. Because the plaintiffs were not
considered for admission in a manner similar to minority students, the court ruled the
applicants had standing to bring their claim. Id. at 567-568. See also Northeastern Fla.
Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656,
663-64 (1993).
10. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 563-67.
11. Id. at 563 n.32. Cheryl Hopwood's UGPA was 3.8 and her LSAT was 39. Id.
at 564. Her father passed away when she was a young· child. While in high school,
Hopwood was offered admission into Princeton, Penn State and Temple. She declined
admission, however, because she had to pay for her own education and work while
attending both high school and college. Id. at 564 n.40. At the time of her application,
she was married to a military serviceman and had two children, one of whom died at
birth and the other who was diagnosed with severe birth defects. Sam Howe Verhovek,
For 4 Whites Who Sued University, Race is the Common Thread, N.Y. TIMES, March
23, 1996, at A6. Hopwood declined to include any of this information in her application
to UT. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 564, n.38. She did, however, submit a letter to the law
school on January 22, 1992, requesting that if she were admitted, she would only be able
to attend the school on a limited basis in her first year, due to the needs of her severely
handicapped daughter. Id. at 564. Kenneth Elliott's UGPA was 2.98 and his LSAT was
167. He is a certified public accountant, and since receiving his undergraduate degree,
Elliott has worked as an auditor or examiner for state agencies. Id. at 565. Douglas
Carvell's UGPA was 3.28. Id. at 566. After talcing the LSAT twice, the first score being
in the 61st percentile and the second in the 91st, his average score placed him in the
76th percentile. Id. at 566 n.47. In a letter of recommendation· contained in Carvell's
admissions file, a professor from Hendrix College complimented Carvell's intellect, but
described his performance as "uneven, disappointing, and mediocre." Id. at 566. David
Rogers attained a UGPA of 3.13 and an LSAT score of 166. In 1985, Rogers was
dismissed from the University of Texas (undergraduate program) due to poor scholastic
performance. He then attended the University of Houston-Downtown, where he received
his degree in professional writing in 1990. Id. at 567.
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Following their rejection, a Texas lawyer contacted these and other
applicants whom the school had rejected regarding a class-action suit.
Plaintiffs agreed and permitted the lawyer to file a lawsuit on their
behalf. 12 The applicants challenged UT's 1992 admission policy as
violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.'3

B.
1.

Applicable Precedent

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke

When the Hopwood lawsuit was filed, the only binding authority
concerning an affirmative action admissions policy was Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke. 14 In Bakke, the Supreme Court
struck down an admissions policy that mandated race-based quotas. In
so doing, the Justices wrote about the appropriate standard of review for
such challenges and the viability of other race-based affirmative action
admission policies. 15
.
In 1973 and 1974, Allen Bakke, a white male, was rejected from the
University of California at Davis Medical School ("Davis"). 16 Each

12. The lawyer, Steven W. Smith, became familiar with the case following his own
investigation into what he perceived to be reverse discrimination. Under the Texas Open
Records Act, Smith obtained the names of dozens of applicants with relatively high
UGPAs and LSAT scores and mailed them letters requesting them to serve as plaintiffs
in this case. Hopwood, Elliott, Carvell and Rogers brought suit with Smith as their
lawyer. Verhovek, supra note 11, at A6.
13. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 553.
14. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). For a general discussion of Bakke, see Garfield, supra
note 5.
15. Justice Powell, in the majority opinion, held that racial and ethnic distinctions
are inherently suspect and call for the "most exacting judicial examination." Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978). Similarly, Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun, agreed in their concurrence, noting that review under the
Fourteenth Amendment must be strict though "not strict in theory and fatal in fact,
because it is stigma that causes fatality - but strict and searching nonetheless." Id. at
361-362 (quotations omitted) (quoting Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 TermForeword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)).
16. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276. When Davis rejected Bakke in 1973, it had filled all
the available seats for applicants from the general admissions pool, but there were still
four open seats reserved for applicants from the minority pool. Id. In 1973, Mr. Bakke
received a benchmark score of 468/500, but his application was late, and after his
application was completed, no applicants in the general admission pool were admitted
with a score below 470/500. At that time four seats in the special admission program
were open, although Mr. Bakke was not considered for these seats. Mr. Bakke wrote to
the Associate Dean and Chairman of the Admissions Committee, Dr. George H. Lowrey,
to protest the admissions quotas. Id. Davis rejected Bakke again in 1974 although the
school accepted minority applicants with lower test scores. In 1974, Mr. Bakke applied
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year, Bakke was rejected while minority students with less impressive
academic credentials were accepted. Following the second rejection,
Allen Bakke sued Davis in state court.17 He challenged the school's
1973 admission policy, adopted in an effort to diversify its entering
class, on the grounds that it operated to exclude him from the school on
the basis of his race. The admissions policy, Bakke argued, violated the
Equal Protection Clause,18 the California Constitution, 19 and Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI). 20
Davis' admission policy divided applicants into two groups. One
group was comprised of non-minority applicants who had achieved a
minimum 2.5 underfaduate GPA. The other was comprised of all
minority applicants.2 The school set aside a certain number of seats

early, received high marks from a student interviewer, but received low marks from the
faculty interviewer, who coincidentally was Dr. Lowrey. Lowrey gave him an 86, the
lowest of his six scores, making his total 549/600 (there were six interviewers in 1974,
so the total score was 600, while in 1973 there were only five interviewers so the score
was out of 500). Under the special admission program, applicants were admitted with
significantly lower credentials than Mr. Bakke. Id. at 277.
17. Bakke sued for mandatory injunctive and declaratory relief. Id. at 277.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, reads:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person oflife, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
19. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 21, repealed and added (as amended) to art. 1, § 7,
reads:
No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may not be
altered, revoked, or repealed by the Legislature; nor shall any citizen, or class
of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms,
shall not be granted to all citizens.
20. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 601, 78 Stat. 252. (1964)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d)(1989), reads:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.
21. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 274-75. Those in the non-minority group were evaluated
on the basis of their UGPA, MCAT score, and observations made during a personal
interview conducted by a member of the Admissions Committee. The Committee
automatically rejected non-minority applicants whose UGPA fell below 2.5. Id. at
273-74. In contrast, minority student applications were referred to a Special Admissions
Committee comprised mainly of members of minority grQups. The minority applicants
were rated in a manner similar to the applicants in the general applicant pool, except that
a 2.5 UGPA did not serve as a ground for summary rejection. Thus, all minority
applicants were considered for admission by the Special Admissions Committee,
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for applicants in each of the groups. 22 Individuals from the general
applicant pool could not fill seats from the minority applicant pool, even
if seats were available.23
The trial court found that Davis' .admission policy was a racial quota
and held that it violated the California and Federal Constitutions and
Title VI.24 The California Supreme Court affirmed. 25 The State
sought Supreme Court review and certiorari was granted. 26 The
Supreme Court, considering both the Equal Protection Clause and Title
VI, affirmed the California Supreme Court decision to strike down the
Davis admissions policy.27 However, the Court was sharply divided.
Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnquist
concluded that the program violated Title VI and, therefore found no
need to consider the constitutional issue.28 Justice Powell agreed that
the Davis program was invalid since specific goals and quotas are
always impermissible to achieve diversity or to dismantle discrimination.
Thus, Justice Powell cast the "swing" vote and wrote the plurality
opinion.
regardless of their UGPA. Id. at 274-75.
With the exception of the minimum UGPA for non-minorities, students were evaluated
for admissions based on the same general criteria. However, each of the two Admissions
Committees operated in a vacuum and did not compare its applicants to the other's
applicant group. The Special Admissions Committee did not rate or compare minority
applicants to the non-minority applicants but could accept or reject applicants based on
failure to meet course requirements or other specific deficiencies. The Special
Admissions Committee continued to recommend applicants until the number set by
faculty vote were admitted. Id.
22. Id. at 275. In 1968, when the overall class size was 50, the faculty set aside
eight seats for minorities. In 1973 and 1974, the overall class size was expanded to 100,
and the number of seats set aside for minorities was expanded to 16. Id.
23. Id. at 275-76.
24. Id. at 278-79. In reaching its conclusion, the trial court emphasized that
minority applicants in the program were rated only against one another, and 16 places
out of the class of 100 were reserved exclusively for minorities. Id.
25. Applying strict scrutiny, it concluded that the program violated the Equal
Protection Clause because it was not the least intrusive means of achieving the school's
compelling goals, and that the program did not pass state constitutional scrutiny or the
Title VI challenge. A majority of the Court concluded that an entity is prohibited from
considering race in programs that use government funds. Id. at 279-80. Thus, Davis was
ordered to admit Bakke into its medical school. Id. at 280-81. .
26. Id. at 281.
27. Id. at 266. A majority of the Court agreed that Davis must admit Bakke. At
the Supreme Court level, UC Davis maintained that there was no private right of action
under Title VI. Id. at 283. However, although the Court reached its decision based on
the Equal Protection argument, it still recognized that a private right of action may exist
under Title VI. Because the issue was not argued or decided below, the Court chose not
to address "this difficult issue." Id. at 283. The Court also did not address the issue of
whether private plaintiffs under Title VI must exhaust administrative remedies prior to
bringing legal action. Id. at 283-84.
28. See generally id. at 408-22.
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In his plurality decision, however, Justice Powell wrote that some
race-based remedial programs are permissible, but the Court must ensure
that such programs do not violate the rights of Caucasians. Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun agreed with Justice Powell that
there are instances where an affirmative action admission program is
permissible and would have found that the Davis program did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause.29
The proper standard of review for the Davis program was of
significant concern to the five Justices who considered the program on
constitutional grounds. Since the policy included "a classification based
on race and ethnic background," it could only stand if it passed the strict
scrutiny test. 30 Thus, the policy was permissible if it was "precisely
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest."31

29. Id. at 325-26. These four Justices concluded that affirmative action admission
policies enacted in response to Title VI are only valid to the extent that they co-exist
with the Fourteenth Amendment. The Justices wrote that Title VI permits federally
funded entities to enact programs or policies that assist minority groups to gain equal
access to programs more easily available to Caucasians. However, Title VI and the Civil
Rights Act do not take precedence over the constitutional protection of the Equal
Protection Clause and thus such programs or policies are only valid to the extent that
they co-exist with the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 325.
30. Id. at 289. The Court has written that "'benign' carries with it no independent
meaning, but reflects only acceptance of the current generation's conclusion that a
politically acceptable burden, imposed on particular citizens on the basis of race, is
reasonable" to correct for general discrimination. Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n., 497 U.S. 547, 610 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors Inc. v.
Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). For an in-depth discussion of benign racial classifications,
see Roy L. Brooks, The Affirmative Action Issue: Law, Policy, and Morality, 22 CONN.
L. REV. 323 (1990).
The Petitioners argued that the affmnative action· admissions policy should not be
subject to strict scrutiny since it was challenged by a white male and not by a member
of a historically discriminated class of people. Justice Powell disagreed with this theory,
recognizing that although the laws of discrimination are founded on a ''two-class" theory
of Black and White Americans, the Equal Protection Clause assures all persons the
protection of equal laws regardless of the status of their particular racial or ethnic group.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294-95. See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). In
their concurrence, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, agreed with Justice
Powell, but wrote that the affirmative action admission policy did not mandate strict
scrutiny but rather such a program is permissible if the court finds "(i) that there has
been some form of discrimination against the preferred minority groups by 'society at
large,"' and "(ii) that 'there is reason to believe' that the disparate impact sought to be
rectified by the program is the 'product' of such discrimination." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 297
n.36.
31. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299. Justice Powell also wrote that "in 'order to justify the
use of a suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is both
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Justice Powell found a compelling governmental interest in attaining
a diverse student body.32 He wrote that "[A] diverse student body"
contributing to a "robust exchange of ideas" is a "constitutionally
permissible goal" on which a race-conscious university admissions
program may be predicated.33 However, although the Constitution does
not bar admission policies from introducing race as a factor in the
selection process, Powell concluded that "[p]referring members of any
one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination
for its own sake."34 The Davis admission policy, which set aside a
specific number of seats for students in identified minority groups,
unfairly elevated the interests of a victimized group at the expense of
other innocent individuals. For this reason, it violated the Equal
Protection Clause.35 Justice Powell's opinion did not preclude schools
from considering race as a factor in instances where a program is free
from clear racial preference or goals. Race or ethnic background may be

constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is
'necessary ... to the accomplishment' of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest."'
Id. at 305 (quoting In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973)). See also Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
32. "[A]ttainment of a diverse student body ... clearly is a constitutionally
permissible goal for an institution of higher education.... The freedom of a university
to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body."
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12.
33. Id. Justice Powell noted that educational excellence is widely believed to be
promoted by a diverse student body. Id. at 312.
34. Id. at 307. "We have never approved a classification that aids persons
perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent
individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of
constitutional or statutory violations." Id.
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun agreed with this, stating that "Title
VI clearly establishes that where there is a need to overcome the effects of past racially
discriminatory or exclusionary practices engaged in by federally funded institutions, race
conscious action is required to accomplish the remedial objectives of Title VI. Id. at 334.
[Title VI] does not bar the preferential treatment of racial minorities as a means of
remedying past societal discrimination to the extent that such action is consistent with
the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 328.
35. Id. at 307-09. Justice Powell upheld the California decision that the special
admissions program was unlawful, and that Mr. Bakke was to be admitted to medical
school, but reversed the decision enjoining the medical school from considering race in
admissions. Id. at 320. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and
Stevens, in a concurring opinion, agreed that the policy was unlawful because it unfairly
favored one group over another. Id. at 325. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun concurred in the holding and dissented in part, as they did not feel that Allen
Bakke should be admitted to the Medical School and that quotas should be maintained.
Id. at 379. They joined in Parts I and V-C. Id. at 328. Along with Justice Powell,
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun upheld the use of race in the
admissions process, while Justices Burger, Stevens, Rehnquist, and Stewart considered
the issue irrelevant to this case. Ron Simmons, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: CONFLICT AND
CHANGE IN HIGHER EDUCATION AFTER BAKKE 2 (1982).
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considered a "plus" in the admissions process.36 Thus, although Powell
invalidated the program, his opinion made it clear that he would not
necessarily invalidate all affirmative action admission programs.37
Justice Brennan wrote that the Court has never adopted, as a proper
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, the notion that the Constitution
must be color-blind. In his opinion, Congress would not have adopted
the Civil Rights Act, which encourages the elimination of discrimination,
while at the same time "forbidding the voluntary use of race-conscious
remedies to cure acknowledged or obvious statutory violations."38 The
Court has held that under certain circumstances, the remedial use of
racial criteria is not only permissible, but is required to eradicate
constitutional violations. 39
The Bakke court set valuable precedent for challenges to race-based
remedial programs. Under Bakke, state affirmative action programs or
polices could not be upheld unless they were precisely tailored to serve
a compelling governmental interest. 4 Furthermore, states could not use
goals or quotas to achieve racial diversity. However, according to five
Justices, states may consider race as a factor when constructing
affirmative action remedial plans.

°

2.

Post-Bakke Challenges

Post-Bakke race-based remedial programs have been set in the
employment arena and, are therefore challenged under Title VII of the

36. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317. For example, assume two applicants, one minority and
one non-minority, have the same UGPA and MCAT scores. Under Justice Powell's
opinion, an admissions committee can offer admission to the minority applicant before
it offers admission to the non-minority applicant since a diversity viewpoint "plus"
UGPA and MCAT score is of more value to the school than a non-diversity viewpoint
and the same "objective" test scores.
37. Id. at 362.
38. Id. at 336.
39. Id. See North Carolina Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971) (invalidating a statute forbidding the assignment of students to school on the basis of race because
it would hinder the implementation of remedies necessary to accomplish desegregation
in the school). Students with pro-civil rights voices are silenced by professors who speak
to the contrary and do not call on them. Students need to hear in the classroom about
"law in every day terms and fit to human needs" and not about "law insulated from
cultural and intellectual diversity, and law focused on cumbersome sieges to the
Constitution rather than on personal accountability and responsible legal administration."
Dennis Graham Combs, Preachers of the Bar, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1993, at E19.
40. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 325.
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Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause.41 Through a series
of cases considering the validity of race-based preference programs in
the employment context, the Court has extended its Bakke ruling, that
race-based policies are subject to strict scrutiny, to all federal and state
race-based remedial programs. Furthermore, it has articulated a clear
definition of the "strict scrutiny" test. A race-based program is constitutionally permissible when a court finds that there is a compelling
governmental interest in a particular program or policy and that the
disputed program or policy is narrowly tailored to achieve the governmental interest.42
The Court has found that a need for diversity may support a compelling governmental interest where education is concerned, but has
required proof of present effects of past discrimination for challenged
race-based programs in the employment arena. 43 A program or policy
is narrowly tailored if the court finds that (1) there is a necessity for the
relief and alternative remedies are less efficient;44 (2) the challenged

41. Since Bakke, courts have rarely heard challenges against schools in which a
plaintiff alleges that an affirmative action admission policy violated Title VI and the
Equal Protection Clause. This is because a plaintiff did not have standing unless he or
she could prove actual harm. The Court recently relaxed the standing requirement. In
Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993), the Court had to determine whether a Jacksonville program
requiring that ten percent of all construction contracts go to Minority Business
Enterprises was constitutional. The challenge was brought by the Northeastern Florida
Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America (Northeastern). The City of
Jacksonville argued that Northeastern did not have standing, as they could not show
actual harm. Id. at 664. The Court held that in cases where the government erected a
barrier that made it more difficult for members of one group to obtain a benefit, the
members of that group did not have to show an injury in fact. Id. at 666. Instead, in
order to prove standing, the group only had to demonstrate that it had difficulty in
obtaining the benefit. Id. Such a showing, was enough to demonstrate a prima facie case
of denial of equal treatment because of the program. Id. at 669. .
42. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995). The purpose
of ascertaining whether a compelling governmental interest exists is to "smoke out'' the
illegitimate uses of race by ensuring that the goal is in fact important. Hopwood v.
Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 569 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2581 (1996) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 459, 493 (1989)). The narrowly tailored analysis "ensures that the means chosen
'fit' [the] compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive
for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype." Croson, 488 U.S.
at 493.
43. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,280 (1986); Croson, 488
U.S. at 488-89.
.
44. See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n. v. Civil Service Comm'n. of New York, 463 U.S.
582 (1983) (holding that relief is necessary where a federally funded entity predicates
professional advancement on tests that yield a variable achievement rate for different
races or ethnicities, even if done so unintentionallyr
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program is flexible and limited in duration;45 (3) there is a reasonable
relationship between the numerical goals and the relevant labor
market;46 and .(4) the relief has a minimal impact on the rights of third
parties.47
Since Bakke, the Court has extended application of the strict scrutiny
test to all race-based remedial programs. However, it has never said that
a race-based remedial program is impermissible. Thus, under these
decisions, any race-based remedial program will be upheld if it is
narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest.

III. THE HOPWOOD
A.

DECISIONS

The District Court Decision

In August, 1994, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas issued its decision in Hopwood v. Texas ("Hopwood
f'). Applying strict scrutiny analysis, the district court, quoting Justice
Powell in Bakke, found that a compelling governmental interest existed
45. See, e.g., Croson, 480 U.S. at 171. See generally Croson, 488 U.S. at 514
(striking down the Minority Business Enterprise legislation since it did not have either
a specific termination date or, at a minimum, a provision for reviewing the legislation).
46. See e.g., id. at 514. The Croson Court found that Richmond's statistical
analysis was not narrowly tailored to its goal of increasing minority participation in
contracting. Id. at 507-08. The legislation required primary contractors who were
awarded city construction contracts to subcontract at least thirty percent of the dollar
amount of each contract to Minority Business Enterprises. Id. at 477-78. The Richmond
legislature chose the numerical goal of 30% based on the percentage of minorities in the
general population. Id. at 499. The Court found that since the City's goal of 30%
minority sub-contractors reflected the general population and not the relevant population
of minority contractors in the area, it was not narrowly tailored. Id. at 507.
47. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987). Bakke struck down the
Davis admission policy because it ·impennissibly granted admissions to minority
applicants who would not otherwise have the opportunity to enter medical school over
white males with higher test scores. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
-319-21 (1978). Davis' separate admissions committees, which were created to increase
the number of minority physicians in the country, led to the medical school's unequal
treatment of applicants. Id. at 310-11. In contrast, Paradise held that the one black to
one white hiring requirement did not pose an unacceptable burden on white males
because the program did not absolutely bar any non-minority individual's advancement.
It merely 'postponed' the white males' advancement. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 182-83. The
Court noted that under the program 50% of those promoted were non-minority, there
were no layoffs, and the basic requirement that black troopers must be qualified still
remain. The Court concluded that these provisions safeguarded the program against
providing unequal treatment for individuals. Id.
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in the school's 1992 admissions policy since the school's efforts were
limited to "seeking the educational benefits that fl.ow from having a
diverse student body and to addressing the present effects of past
discriminatory practices."48 In other words, the compelling governmental interest was supported by both the need to diversify the school's
entering class and the present effects of past discrimination. The court
concluded that without the diversity admission policy, UT would not
have achieved a diverse student body. 49 Recent Office of Civil Rights
:findings coupled with the State's "long history of discriminating against
[B]lacks and Mexican Americans," and UT's history ofracial discrimination, were sufficient evidence to establish that the remedial purpose of
UT's diversity admission policy constituted a compelling governmental
interest. 50
Although the court concluded that UT had a compelling interest· in
using a diversity admission policy, the policy failed to pass constitutional
muster because it was not narrowly tailored to meet the goals of
diversity and reversing past discrimination. The court found that the
diversity admission policy met the first three prongs of the narrowly
tailored test. 51 First, UT sufficiently demonstrated that the race-based
admissions policy was necessary since it was impossible to achieve
diversity without an affirmative action admission policy.52 Second, the
program was temporary in nature because the objective of UT was to
narrow the gap progressively so that at some point in time UT would no
longer need a diversity admission policy. 53 Third, UT's goals for

48. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. 551, 570 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 78 F.3d 932 (5th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2581 (1996) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313
("environment fostering robust exchange of ideas makes goal of diversity 'of paramount
importance in the fulfillment of [a university's] mission"'); Podberesky v. Kirwan, 956
F.2d. 52, 57 (4th Cir. 1992) ("race- related remedy may be used in an attempt to remedy
effects of past discrimination").
49. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 572. IfUT had considered minorities under the 1992
general admissions policy, without regard to race or ethnicity, the admissions committee
would have offered seats to 936 students. Id. at 563 n.32. Nine of these students were
identified as African American and eighteen students identified themselves as Mexican
American. Id. at 571.
50. Id. at 572.
51. Id. at 569-78.
52. Id. at 573. The court also noted that the ultimate effect of abandoning the
diversity admission policy would be to redirect minority students to the historically
separate state law school at Texas Southern University, thereby segregating the law
school again. Id.
53. Id. at 575. The court noted that the admissions committee regularly meets to
review and to readjust the diversity admission policy to meet the current needs of the
school of law with regard to diversity. Id.
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minority enrollment as a percent of total enrollment bore a reasonable
relationship to the percent of minority college graduates in Texas. 54
Ultimately, the court held that the diversity admission policy violated
the Fourteenth Amendment because it failed to afford each individual
applicant a comparison with the entire pool of applicants. 55 The court
recognized the.laudable and imperative goal of diversity in the education
system. Moreover, it agreed with Justice Powell that race or ethnicity
could be considered a ''plus" factor in a school's consideration of a
particular applicant.56 The court noted that when weighing
non-traditional factors in the admissions decision, it is permissible for an
admissions committee to choose an applicant with a lower LSAT and/or
UGPA. Such an applicant may be preferable based on qualifications that·
include non-objective factors. 57 Thus, the court ruled in a manner
consistent with Bakke, holding that race can be a factor in considering
a candidate's application for admission so long as a school does not use
race to meet goals or to set quotas.
The court permitted the law school to reconstitute its admissions
policy, allowing it to consider race as a factor in admissions decisions,
but requiring the school to review minority and non-minority candidates
as a group. 58 It awarded each plaintiff $1.00 in damages and granted
plaintiffs the right to reapply to UT, without paying the requisite filing

54. Id.
55. Id. at 579.
56. Id. at 577 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317
(1978)). The court also recognized other schools with seemingly similar affirmative
action admission policies.
57. Id. Justice Powell noted that:·
"[t]he applicant who loses out on the last available seat to another candidate
receiving a 'plus' on the basis of ethnic background will not have been
foreclosed from all consideration for that seat simply because he was not the
right color or had the wrong surname. It would mean only that his combined
qualifications, which may have included similar nonobjective factors, did not
outweigh those of the other applicant."
Id.
58. Weeks before the trial began, UT modified its admissions plan. As of
September 1, 1994, the admissions committee has consisted of one full time faculty
member and the assistant dean of admissions. Race and ethnicity have continued to be
factors, but the law school has removed its "presumptively deny" and "discretionary"
categories and has reviewed all candidates that have not automatically been admitted
based on their TI number. Janet Elliot, UT Responds to Suit with Policy Changes, TEXAS
LAWYER, May 23, 1994 at IO.
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fees. 59 Following this decision, UT appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.60

B.

The Fifth Circuit Decision

· A three member panel61 for the Fifth Circuit decided Hopwood v.
Texas (Hopwood JI) on March 18, 1996.62 The court overturned the
lower court decision permitting UT to reconstitute its 1992 admissions
policy, and struck down the policy as violative of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.63 A majority of the panel broadly ruled that UT may not use race
as a factor in law school admissions, and suggested that every school in
its jurisdiction is prohibited from doing the same.64 The panel also
dismissed an appeal requesting intervention in the case by two black
student groups for lack of jurisdiction.65
Judges Smith and DeMoss66 rejected Justice Powell's holding in
Bakke67 that there is a compelling governmental interest in the attainment of a diverse student body. The judges wrote that Justice Powell's

59. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 583.
60. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2581
(1996). The appeal for case number 94-50664 was filed on October 3, 1994, by Cheryl
Hopwood. The appeal for case number 94-50569 was filed on August 25, 1994, by the
Thurgood Marshall Legal Society and the Black Pre-Law Association.
61. The panel's members were Judges Harold R. DeMoss, Jr., Jerry E. Smith, and
Jacques L. Weiner, Jr. Judge Smith was a Reagan appointee. Both Judges DeMoss and
Weiner were appointed by President Bush. Debbie Graves, Lawyer Says 4 Whites
Wouldn't Make '92 Cut; As 'Marginal' Applicants, UT Says Affirmative Action Didn't
Hurt Plaintiffs, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Aug. 9, 1995, at Al.
62. 78 F.3d 932.
63. Id. at 934-35.
64. Id. at 944-46, 950.
65. Id. at 959. The proposed interveners are two black student groups from the
University of Texas at Austin and its law school. The groups sought to intervene because
they felt that UT would not effectively protect their interests in continuing racial
preferences at the school. The district court denied their motion to intervene on the
ground that the two associations and the law school did indeed have the same objective:
to maintain the status quo. Id. At the close of the trial, but before judgment, the
associations sought to intervene, raising two new defenses that were not represented
during the course of the trial: I) that the TI was an unconstitutional basis for admissions
under Title VI, and 2) that affirmative action policies at the university were constitutionally required. Id. at 960. The associations moved to reopen the record as interveners
and introduce evidence supporting their new defenses. The district court, who reviewed
the associations' claims de novo and on the merits, denied this motion. Id. at 960-61.
When a prior panel discusses an issue on the merits, a later panel cannot arrive at an
adverse decision based on the preclusive principle of the "law of the case." Id. at 960.
Consequently, because the law of the case doctrine prevents merit review, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the denial of the intervention motion for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 961.
66. Judges Harold R. DeMoss, Jr. and Jerry E. Smith.
67. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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opinion in Bakke was not binding since it was not the general consensus
of the Court.68 In order to establish a compelling governmental
interest, the judges looked to the Supreme Court's definition of a
compelling governmental interest in Title VII employment discrimination
cases. The judges would only find a compelling governmental interest
if there were present effects of past discrimination.69
As evidence of the present effects of past discrimination, the lower
court relied on the Office of Civil Rights findings of discrimination
throughout the law school and the entire UT system. In contrast, the
Fifth Circuit majority defined the proper unit for analysis of the effects
of discrimination as the law school. 70. At UT, the judges held, there
were no recognizable present effects of the law school's past discrimination.71 The majority concluded that since UT could not show prior
discrimination by the law school, it could not use race as a factor in
deciding which applicants to admit in order to achieve a diverse student
body.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Weiner agreed that the 1992 UT
admissions policy did not pass strict scrutiny. The UT policy was not
narrowly tailored to achieve diversity since it set one TI range for
blacks, a different range for Mexican Americans, and a different range
for other races. 72 However, he disagreed with the majority that
diversity can never support a compelling governmental interest. 73 He
wrote that Supreme Court precedent supports the proposition that
achieving diversity in a public graduate or professional school could be

68. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944. Similarly, in Bakke, the concurring opinion of
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun rejected Justice Powell's position that
attaining diversity in a student body was a compelling governmental interest. In Bakke,
the word "diversity" is mentioned nowhere except in Justice Powell's opinion. Id.
Rather, Powell's four brethren noted that the ''use of race to achieve an integrated
student body" is constitutional if "necessitated by the lingering effects of past
discrimination." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 326 n. l. Preferential treatment ofracial minorities
is permissible, they held, "as a means of remedying past societal discrimination to the
extent that such action is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 328.
69. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 951. The law school argued that the court should look to "Texas's
well-documented history of discrimination in education." Id. at 948. The majority,
however was unwilling to look at such a broad field.
72. Id. at 936.
73. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 962.

511

a compelling governmental interest. 74 Ultimately, Judge Weiner wrote
that the definition and application of a compelling governmental interest
where education is concerned, should be left to constitutional interpretation, and he perceived "no 'compelling' reason to rush in where the
Supreme Court fears--or at least declines--to tread."75
C.

The Supreme Court Decision

On July 1, 1996, the Supreme Court denied the state's petition for
certiorari, 76 thereby letting the Fifth Circuit decision stand. Although
there was no opinion accompanying the decision, 77 Justice Ginsberg
wrote a brief concurrence, joined by Justice Souter.78 Justice Ginsberg
denied certiorari because UT had already changed its 1992 admissions
policy to reflect the district court decision, making the issue moot. 79
However, Justice Ginsberg suggested that there would be a time in the
future when the Court would address "the important question raised in
this opinion."80
·
IV.

CLARIFICATION AND IMPACT OF '.fHE HOPWOOD DECISIONS

A.

The Conflicting Definitions of Diversity

Hopwood I and Hopwood II illustrate the different viewpoints of
affirmative action scholars. Hopwood I stands for the reaffirmation of
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. Although the Hopwood I court ruled
out a dual admission ·policy that "insulated applicants" from review
against each other,81 it recognized the value the Supreme Court placed
on diversity and its pronouncement that the need for diversity in
education may serve as a compelling governmental interest for the
purpose of satisfying the strict scrutiny test.
In contrast, the Hopwood II court ruling means that a need for
diversity may never support a compelling governmental interest for
purposes of satisfying the strict scrutiny test. Under Hopwood II,

74. Id. at 964.
75. Id. at 965.
76. Texas v. Hopwood, 116 S.Ct 2581 (1996).
77. Id. (writing, "[t]he petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.").
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. (stating, "we must await a final judgement on a program genuinely in
controversy before addressing the important question raised in this petition.").
81. See also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978).
With the exception of separately reviewing minority candidates, the admissions
committees treated applicants similarly.
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race-based programs in the educational setting are subject to the
restraints the Court has placed on employment race-based remedial
programs. Thus, in the Fifth Circuit, "any consideration of race or
ethnicity by [a state school] for the purpose of achieving a diverse
student body is not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment."82
Justice Ginsberg's concurrence in the denial of certiori suggests that
the definition of a compelling governmental interest remains open for
review. The Hopwood II decision creates a split in the circuits where
education is concerned. The Hopwood I decision follows the seemingly
applicable precedent set in Bakke and that diversity supports a compelling governmental interest in Title VI cases. In contrast, Hopwood II
held educational race-based policies to the same standard as employment-related remedial programs.
The Hopwood II majority was correct that as a general rule, the
Supreme Court has been unwilling to permit race-based remedial
programs unless the governmental entity can demonstrate present effects
of past discrimination. 83 However, it failed to recognize that the Court
has carved out an exception where education is concerned. Beginning
with Bakke, the Court has not required evidence of present effects of
past discrimination in upholding educational race-based policies. This
is because educational diversity equally benefits all students, regardless
ofrace. 84 Nor has the Court held that Title VI education discrimination
cases are subject to the same analysis and requirements as Title VII
employment discrimination cases. 85

82. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct.
2581 (1996).
83. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 488-89 (1989).
84. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994),
rev'd, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2581 (1996). Under the current law,
the goal of diversity is sufficient by itself to satisfy a compelling governmental interest.
Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 571. See Shurberg Broad. of Hartford, Inc. v. Fed.
Communications Comm'n., 876 F.2d 902, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. granted, Astroline
Communications Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Shurberg Broad. of Hartford, Inc., 493 U.S.
1018 (1990), rev'd, Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n., 497 U.S. 547
(1990).
85. But see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2112 (1995)
(reversing Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n., 497 U.S. 547 (1990)
(by extending the strict scrutiny test to federal programs)).
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In Hopwood II the majority concluded that Justice Powell's opinion
in Bakke was not binding since his opinion was merely a "swing vote"
in the Court's plurality decision.86 In fact, Powell's decision was not
a "swing vote" since four other Justices would have gone further than
Powell in permitting the use of race for remedial or diversity purposes.
In Bakke, Justice Brennan, writing for Justices White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, wrote that "UC Davis' goals of reversing minority
underrepresentation in the medical profession justifies the school's
remedial use of race. Thus, the majority reversed the judgment below
since it prohibited universities from considering race as a factor in their
admissions process."87 Thus, five Justices endorsed the need for
diversity to support a compelling governmental interest, not one Justice,
as the Fifth Circuit panel incorrectly concluded.
In Bakke, Justice Powell wrote most .strongly about the benefits of
diversity in education. He noted that these benefits flow two ways,
minority students are brought into the classroom while non-minority
students benefit from hearing the voices of others. 88 Thus, he wrote
that diversity is an essential element of education in undergraduate
school and in medical school. Quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 89 Justice.
Powell wrote that legal learning is ineffective "in isolation from the
individuals and institutions with which the law interacts."90

86. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.
87. See generally Bakke, 438 U.S. at 257-62.
88. Id. at 313. Justice Powell wrote that "[a]n otherwise qualified medical student
with a particular background ... bring[s] to a professional school of medicine
experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training of its student body." Id. at 314.
Diversity better equips graduates ''to render with understanding their vital service to
humanity." Id. An environment fostering robust exchange of ideas makes the goal of
diversity of "paramount importance in the fulfillment of [a university's] mission." Id. at
313. Justice Powell further wrote that "whether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally
advantaged or disadvantaged ... [students] may bring to a professional school ...
outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training of its student body and better equip its
graduates to render with understanding their vital service to humanity." Id. at 314.
89. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
90. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 (quoting Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634). Since Bakke, various
Justices have echoed Justice Powell's opinion. In Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, the Court considered the validity of FCC policies granting preferential
treatment based on race, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, wrote that "a 'diverse
student body' contributing to a 'robust exchange of ideas' is a 'constitutionally
permissible goal."' Metro, 497 U.S. at 568 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-13). In
Wygant v. Jacksonville Bd. of Educ., the Court reversed a decision upholding a
bargaining agreement that limited the number of minority teachers the Board of
Education would lay-off in order to preserve the ratio of minority to non-minority
faculty. Four Justices recognized the compelling governmental interest in diversifying
education. Justice O'Connor in her concurrence wrote that the "state interest in the
promotion of racial diversity [in education] has been found sufficiently 'compelling."'
Wygant v. Jacksonville Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986). Justices Marshall,
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The Hopwood II majority wrote a seemingly disingenuous opinion.
At the outset, the manner in which the court characterized the facts
suggest it had its own social or political agenda. At times, the majority
used language reminiscent of prohibited civil rights language, for
example, it described the admissions waiting list as "segregated."91
The majority characterized Justice Powell's opinion as both argumentative and speculative. The majority also was sharply critical of the lower
court decision. With reference to damages, the majority called the
plaintiffs' victory "pyrrhic at best".92 The majority further criticized
the lower court for finding a compelling governmental interest in UT's
1992 admissions policy, and rejected the notion that diversity in
education is sufficient to support a compelling governmental interest.

Brennan, and Blackmun in their dissent agreed with Justice O'Connor that the state has
a compelling governmental interest in diversifying education. Id. at 295, 306.
When considering whether there is a compelling governmental interest in enacting a
race-based preference policy, the Court evaluates the intrusion of a particular policy on
innocent individuals. Although in an effort to eradicate racial discrimination the Court
may uphold policies whereby "innocent persons may be called upon to bear some of the
burden," any imposition must be strongly limited. Id. at 281. Thus in Wygant, a majority
of the Court held that a preferential lay-off policy imposed too great a burden on
innocent third parties since it translated into loss of an existing job for some innocent
third parties. Id. at 282-83. Chief Justice Burger, Justices Powell, Rehnquist, O'Connor
and White reversed the decision of the sixth circuit. Four Justices suggested that race-based hiring goals might be more acceptable than a lay-off program since such a policy
only resulted in denial of future employment opportunity and was therefore· not as
intrusive as the loss of an existing job. Id. at 283.
91. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 938. "Such separate lists apparently helped the law
school maintain a pool of potentially acceptable but marginal minority candidates." Id.
The court noted that UT had a policy of reviewing minority applicants in the
discretionary zone "differently from whites," although each reviewing process was
identical. Id. at 937.
92. Id. at 938. Powell argued that diversity of minority viewpoints furthering
academic freedom is an interest under the constitution. Id. at 943. "Justice Powell
speculated that a program in which race or ethnic background may be deemed a 'plus'
in a particular applicant's file ... [might] pass [constitutional] muster." Id. (quoting
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317). Justice Powell argued that academic freedom, though not a
constitutional right, has "'long . . . been viewed as a special concern of the First
Amendment."' Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312). "[Justice Powell] intimated that the
Constitution would allow schools to continue to use race in a wide-ranging manner." Id.
at 944. "Justice Powell's argument in Bakke garnered only his own vote and has never
represented the view of a majority of the Court in Bakke or any other case." Id. "[T]here
has been no indication from the Supreme Court, other than Justice Powell's lonely
opinion in Bakke, that the state's interest in diversity constitutes a compelling
justification for governmental race-based discrimination." Id. at 945.
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The Fifth Circuit decision creates a clear split in the circuits.
According to majority, race can no longer be considered a factor in the
admissions process if the admissions policy is designed to promote
diversity. However, in truth, the Hopwood II majority is merely a
decision of two justices. It is reasonable to believe that this small panel
could not effectively overrule 20 years of precedent.
B.

A Brief Glimpse into the Future

Affirmative action proponents lament the judiciary's apparent trend
toward eliminating affirmative action programs and policies.93 They
disagree with Justice O'Connor's pronouncement in her majority
opinion94 in the 1995 decision of Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena,95
that the Court's affirmative action analysis may be ".'strict in theory, but
[it is not] fatal in fact."' 96 Instead they read the Fifth Circuit's
Hopwood II decision as another step toward curtailment of affirmative
action polices and programs.97
Justice Ginsberg's concurrence in the denial of certiorari suggests that
the definition of a compelling governmental interest in educational race93. See Joan Biskupic, Court Toughens Standards for Federal Affirmative Action;
Court Toughens U.S. Standard for Affirmative Action, WASIDNGTON POST, June 13,
1995, at Al.
94. Justice O'Connor delivered the majority opinion and was joined by Justice
Kennedy. Justice Scalia and Thomas filed opinions concurring in part and concurring
in the judgement. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Ginsberg
joined. Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Ginsberg and Breyer
joined. Justice Ginsberg filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Breyer joined.
95. 115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995). Adarand considered the constitutionality of a federal
statute that granted financial incentives to prime contractors who awarded subcontracts
to companies controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. Id. at
2102. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, considered the appropriate level of
review for assessing whether the Federal program was permissible. She noted that prior
to Adarand, "benign" federal racial classifications need only satisfy intermediate
scrutiny. See Metro, 497 U.S. at 564-65 ("benign" federal racial classifications are
permissible if they serve important governmental objectives within the power of
Congress and are substantially related to achievement of those objectives). This was in
sharp contrast to the Court's requirement that the Equal Protection Clause demands strict
scrutiny of "benign" State or local race-based preference policies. A majority of the
Adarand Court held that the same more stringent standard should apply to all race-based
preference policies regardless of who is implementing the policy, since the strict scrutiny
test "ensure[s] that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been
infringed." Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
96. Id. at 2117 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 519 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring). See also supra note 95 and accompanying text.
97. See Brittain, supra note 8; Linda Seebach, Race-Based Programs are on Their
Way Out, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Sept. 3, 1996, at B6; David Jackson, Justices Let
Admissions Ruling Stand; Effect on Affirmative Action Debated, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, July 2, 1996 at Al; Aaron·Epstein, Schools in 3 States Can't Consider Race,
POST & COURIER; July 2, 1996 at A3.

516

[VOL.

34: 497, 1997]

Hopwood v. Texas
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

based programs remains open to Supreme Court consideration. When the
Court deems the issue of defining a compelling governmental interest in
Title VI cases as ripe, it could choose to overrule Justice Powell's Bakke
opinion. In that event, a need for diversity could no longer support a
compelling governmental interest in Title VI race-based remedial
programs. Instead, an educational institution defending its affirmative
action admissions policy would need to present proof of present effects
of past discrimination in order to maintain such a program.
Requiring proof of present effects of past discrimination in Title VI
cases would overrule Bakke and would vitiate the reasoning behind the
distinction between a compelling governmental interest for purposes of
Title VI education cases, and Title VII employment cases. Justice Powell
wrote of the benefit of diversity to all individuals in the classroom
regardless of race or ethnicity. Both minorities and non-minorities
enhance their educational experience with exposure to differing
viewpoints. In contrast, race-based remedial programs in the employment sector more directly benefit the minority group they are designed
to assist. When eradicating discrimination in the employment sector,
"innocent persons may be called upon to bear some of the burden of the
remedy. ,,gs
Because of the burden non-minorities feel in the work place when
race-based affirmative action admission policies are employed, the Court
held that there must be a clear presentation of the present effects of past
discrimination.99 The Court has held that the need for role models for
future minorities is insufficient to support a compelling governmental
interest where there is no benefit to non-minorities. 100 The support for
requiring proof of present effects of discrimination in the workplace is
inconsistent with extending this burdensome requirement to Title VI
programs if one is to accept Justice Powell's opinion of the value of
diversity in the classroom.
The Court's decision to deny certiorari in Hopwood is troublesome
since it lets the Hopwood II decision stand in the Fifth Circuit.
However, Justice Ginsberg's dissent should be read to mean that the
Court did not endorse the Fifth Circuit decision, but rather refused to
take a case considering the issue was moot. Given the Court's

98.
99.
100.

Wygant v. Jacksonville Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,281 (1986).
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 165 (1987).
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 497-98 (1989).
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reluctance to overrule itself, the latter may be the better view and one
could hope that should a justiciable case come before the Court in the
future, it will serve as a vehicle to reaffirm Justice Powell's decision in
Bakke.

V.

CONCLUSION

The Hopwood decisions leave educational institutions uncertain as to
the appropriate measures they may take to ensure diversity in the
classroom. The Fifth Circuit prohibits schools from creating race-based
admissions policies, and instead forces schools to create admissions
policies based primarily on past academic performance. Such narrow
requirements will yield an admission pool similar to that of the pre-Civil
Rights Act era that initially prompted adoption of race-based remedial
programs.
The split created by the Fifth Circuit did not prompt the Supreme
Court to clarify whether the Circuit's decision to adopt a Title VII
analysis to Title VI cases is legally sound. Instead, the Court has written
that it will wait to respond to this issue until a justiciable case comes
before it. Until that time, the rest of the country must wait too.
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